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THE INVERSE PROBLEM IN CONVEX OPTIMIZATION WITH
LINEAR CONSTRAINTS
MARWAN ALOQEILI
Abstract
In this paper, we solve an inverse problem arising in convex optimization. We consider a maximiza-
tion problem under m linear constraints. We characterize the solutions of this kind of problems.
More precisely, we give necessary and sucient conditions for a given function in Rn to be the solu-
tion of a multi-constraint maximization problem. The conditions we give here extend well-known
results in microeconomic theory.
Keywords: inverse problem, multi-constraint maximization, value function, Slutsky
relations.
Mathematics Subject Classication(MSC): 90C45, 49N45.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider a multi-constraint maximization problem of the form
max
x
f(x)
Ax  C(A)
where x 2 Rn, A is an m  n matrix and f and C are some functions that sat-
isfy certain conditions which will be specied later. Hence, we are dealing with a
multi-constraint maximization problem with linear constraints. The solution of this
problem is a function of the parameters A = (aij). We assume certain conditions
on the functions f and C that guarantee the dierentiability of the solutions which
we require to be at least of class C2. Our main objective is to characterize the so-
lutions of this type of optimization problems. We rely on the rst order conditions
and optimality conditions to achieve our objective. Moreover, we make use of the
envelope theorem and the value function, V (A) = f(x(A)), of the above problem.
Such kind of problems arise in many applications especially in some economic
contexts in microeconomic theory. Economic applications to this problem will be
given in the sequel. Moreover, we will show that the results we get here generalize
well-known results in consumer theory, see [6] for a recent survey. An inverse
problem arising from economic theory was also solved by Ekeland and Djitte, [8].
We use the indirect approach to deal with this problem. This approach depends
on the value function, V (A). The necessary and sucient conditions on a given
function x(A) 2 Rn for the existence of a value function will be given. It turns
out that the necessary and sucient conditions will include a set of function ij ,
i; j = 1; :::;m that can be computed from x(A). The problem then is to nd the
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objective function. This is a duality problem. We consider a class of functions
introduced by Epstein [10] that is stable under duality.
Our problem will be split into mathematical integration problem and economic
integration problem. The mathematical and the economic integration problems can
be stated as follows:
 Mathematical integration Given a function x(A) and a family of func-
tions ik, 1  i; k  m, what are the necessary and sucient conditions
for the existence of m+ 1 functions 1; :::; m and V that satisfy equation
(2.2) with ik = i=k and C
i(ai) = (ai)Tx(A).
 Economic integration In addition to the mathematical integration, we
impose the following additional conditions on the functions that satisfy
(2.2): the functions i are strictly positive and the function V is quasi-
convex with respect to each ai for all i = 1; :::;m.
Both of these problems will be solved. The duality problem will then be solved.
In this model, the objective function is assumed to satisfy a set of conditions that
will be specied later. One of these conditions requires f to be strictly increasing in
each of its arguments. This condition permits us to write the inequality constraints
as equalities.
To get the necessary and sucient conditions for mathematical integration, we
use the techniques of exterior dierential calculus that showed to be powerful for
the treatment of such problems. A good reference to these techniques is the book
by Bryant et.al. [4]. We get local results; that is, the functions involved in the
integration problem are dened in a neighbourhood of some given point. We dene
a family of dierential forms and set up an integration problem using these forms.
The solution of this integration problem, then, requires solving a nonlinear system of
partial dierential equations. The integration problem will be solved using Darboux
theorem, [4].
The rest of the article is organized in the following way: in the next section, we
set up the model and present its basic assumptions. Then, the main results that
include the necessary and sucient conditions for mathematical integration are
given in section 3 and section 4. In section 5, the economic integration problem is
solved. Then, duality problem is considered. The necessary and sucient conditions
for the 2-constraint case are given section 7. The geometry of the problem and some
economic applications are nally discussed. Proofs of main results are gathered in
the appendix.
2. Setting up the model
We consider a multi-constraint maximization problem of the form
(P)
(
max
x
f(x)
Ax = C(A)
Where f is a function that satises certain regularity and convexity conditions that
will be specied later, A is an m n matrix of rank m and C : Rmn++ ! Rm++ is a
given mapping. The ith constraint takes the form (ai)Tx = Ci(A) where ai is the
ith row of the matrix A. Dene the Lagrangian function
L(x; ) = f(x) +
mX
i=1
k(C
k(A) 
nX
l=1
akl x
l)
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with x 2 Rn++ and  2 Rm++. The rst order conditions for interior maximum are
@f
@xj
=
mX
k=1
ka
k
j ; j = 1; :::; n
Ax = C(A)
Dene the value function of this problem by
V (A) = max
x
ff(x) +
mX
k=1
k(C
k(A) 
nX
l=1
akl x
l)g
If the functions C1(a1); :::; Cm(am) are convex on Rn++ then the value function
V (a1; :::; am) is quasi-convex with respect to each ai for i = 1; :::;m, see [2].
Dierentiating the function V (A) with respect to aij and using the envelope
theorem we get
@V
@aij
=
mX
k=1
k
@Ck
@aij
  ixj (2.1)
We suppose that Ck is a function of the vector ak 2 Rn++ only, where ak is
the kth row of the matrix A. Moreover, we assume that each component of the
mapping C(A) is not homogeneous of degree one because this entails division by
zero. This implies, in particular that, the function x(A) is not homogeneous of
degree zero and the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the ith constraint, i(A)
is not homogeneous of degree  1 in ai. The case of homogeneous mapping C(A)
will not be treated here. We adopt the following assumptions on the mapping C:
Assumption 2.1. For each i 2 f1; :::;mg, we assume that the function Ci has the
following properties:
(a) Ci : Rn++ ! R++ is a function of ai only.
(b) Ci is a convex function of ai.
(c) Ci is of class C2.
(d) Ci is not homogeneous of degree one in ai; that is, (ai)TDaiC
i   Ci(ai) 6= 0.
We consider the following assumptions on the objective function f :
Assumption 2.2. Assume the function f satises the following conditions:
(1) f is strictly increasing in each of its arguments.
(2) the Hessian matrix D2xf is negative denite on the subspace fDxfg?.
(3) f is of class C2.
By applying the implicit function theorem, one can show that the solution of the
above maximization problem as well as the associated vector of Lagrange multipliers
are of class C2, we refer to [3] for details. Assumption 1(a) implies that DaiC
k = 0
if i 6= k which reduces equation (2.1) to
@V
@aij
= i
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
(2.2)
Dene a family of dierential 1-forms !1; :::; !m by
!i =
nX
j=1
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
daij (2.3)
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It follows that the dierential of V , dV , can be written as
dV =
mX
i=1
i!
i (2.4)
Notice that
d!i =
X
j;l
@2Ci
@ail@a
i
j
dail ^ daij  
X
j;k;l
@xj
@akl
dakl ^ daij
The coecients in the rst summation are symmetric, so we end up with
d!i =  
X
j;k;l
@xj
@akl
dakl ^ daij (2.5)
The ith constraint is (ai)Tx(A) = Ci(ai). Dierentiating both sides of this equality
with respect to aij and rearranging, we get
@Ci
@aij
  xj =
nX
r=1
@xr
@aij
air (2.6)
Using this result, the 1-form !i can be written as
!i =
nX
r;j=1
@xr
@aij
airda
i
j (2.7)
Now, our inverse problem can be stated as follows:
 We observe the functions xj(A), j = 1; :::; n from Rmn++ to R++.
 Then we dene the functions Ci(ai)  (ai)Tx(A).
 We observe also a family of positive functions ik using symmetry condi-
tions that will be given below.
 Our objective is to nd a function f(x), by rst nding the value function
V (A), such that x(A) 2 argmaxff(x)jAx = C(A)g and V (A) = f(x(A)).
The inverse problem will be solved in three steps. In the rst step, we identify
a set of necessary conditions. Then, we nd sucient conditions by solving the
following problem: given a family of m dierential 1 forms 
1; :::;
m that satisfy
the conditions

i ^ 
k = 0; for any i; k
can we nd m + 1 functions 1; :::; m and V such that kdV = 
k. Notice that
the function V is independent of k. Finally, we solve for functions that have the
required curvature and positivity conditions. Notice that the family of m 1-forms,
f
1; :::;
mg generates a vector space of dimension one; that is, spanf
1; :::;
mg =
spanf
1g.
Henceforth, we set i(A) = ((a
i)T (Daix)a
i) 1. Note that it is an observed
quantity (it can be computed from x(A) and A). We wrote i(A) to emphasize the
fact that i is a function of A. In fact, i can be written as
 1i = (a
i)T (Daix)a
i =
nX
j=1
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
aij = (a
i)T (DaiC
i)  Ci(ai)
where  1i is the reciprocal of i. Using equation (2.2), we nd that
(ai)T (DaiV ) = i((a
i)T (DaiC
i)  Ci(ai))
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Remark 2.1. Let us suppose, for a moment, that Ci(ai) is homogeneous of degree
; that is, (ai)T (DaiC
i) = Ci(ai). It follows from the this equation that
(ai)T (DaiV ) = i(  1)Ci(ai)
We conclude that (ai)T (DaiV ) is negative, zero or positive if  < 1,  = 1 or  > 1,
respectively. If  = 1 then Ci(ai) is homogeneous of degree one in which case the
value function V is homogeneous of degree zero, hence (ai)T (DaiV ) = 0. Moreover,
we conclude that 0 < Ci(ai) = (ai)T (DaiC
i  (Daix)ai). Notice that if Ci(ai) = ci
(Ci is independent of ai) then  1i =  ci.
Using equations (2.2) and (2.6) we nd that
i = i
X
j
@V
@aij
aij
Consequently, i and (a
i)TDaiV should have the same sign since i > 0. Moreover,
we have
@Ci
@aij
  xj = @V=@a
i
j
i
P
j
@V
@aij
aij
(2.8)
We will come back to this equation in the applications section as this equation has
an important counterpart in economics.
To allow for better follow up of our exposition, we will restrict the ranges of the
subscripts and superscripts used in the sequel as follows, 1  i; k; k0; s; t  m and
1  j; j0; l; l0; r  n. In what follows, ik denotes the Kronecker symbol which equals
one if i = k and zero otherwise.
Now we are ready to give our main results. We rst identify a set of necessary
conditions satised by the function x(A) as well as the vector of Lagrange multipli-
ers. Then, the necessary and sucient conditions for mathematical and economic
integration will be given.
3. Mathematical Integration: Necessary Conditions
In the following sections we give the main results of the paper. We rst give a set
of symmetry conditions satised by the function x(A). Then, we give the necessary
and sucient conditions for mathematical integration. Necessary conditions permit
us to specify (proportionality) functions ik > 0. As we will see, sucient conditions
involve a system of partial dierential equations that should be satised by these
functions as well as x. Consider the following result
Theorem 3.1. Let x(A) be a solution of problem (P) and (A) be the correspond-
ing vector of Lagrange multipliers. Then, the following symmetry conditions are
satised:
i
0@@xl
@aij
  i
nX
j0=1
@xl
@aij0
aij0
nX
r=1
@xr
@aij
air
1A = k
0@@xj
@akl
  k
nX
j0=1
@xj
@akj0
akj0
nX
r=1
@xr
@akl
akr
1A
(3.1)
for all 1  i; k  m and 1  j; l  n.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Some remarks are in order:
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Remark 3.1. (a) As the function x(A) is observable, we can use symmetry condi-
tions (3.1) that we write as klij = 
ij
kl to determine the proportionality functions
ik := i=k. It is important to point out that we do not observe the Lagrange
multipliers 1; :::; m. We observe, however, the functions ik. The above nec-
essary conditions can be written as iSk = kS
T
i where Sk is the n n matrix
whose ij entry is given by
Sjlk =
@xj
@akl
  k
nX
j0=1
@xj
@akj0
akj0
nX
r=1
@xr
@akl
akr
(b) Conditions (3.1) mean that there is a symmetric matrix corresponding to each
constraint and these matrices are proportional.
Theorem 3.2. Let x(A) be a solution of problem (P) and 1; :::; m are the corre-
sponding Lagrange multipliers. Then the following conditions are equivalent
(a) iSk = kS
T
i , for all i; k = 1; :::;m.
(b)
mP
i=1
id!
i ^ !1 ^ ::: ^ !m = 0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
As a consequence of the last theorem, we can conclude that the conditions given
in theorem 3.1 are necessary but not sucient for the decomposition dV =
P
i i!
i.
Moreover, if there is only one constraint then S = ST if and only if d!^! = 0. Con-
sequently, the condition d!^! = 0 is both necessary and sucient for mathematical
integration in the single constraint case. In the multi-constraint case, however, we
need additional conditions on the proportionality functions ik := i=k as well
as on the function x(A). Symmetry conditions can also be interpreted as follows:
for any given i and k, we x all variables except ai and ak. Optimality conditions
imply that i!
i + k!
k = dV . Consequently, we have d(i!
i) =  d(k!k) which
implies that iSk = kS
T
i . However, the above theorem proves that iSk = kS
T
i ,
for all i and k, are equivalent to
mP
i=1
id!
i 2 spanf!1; :::; !mg which means thatPm
i=1 id!
i +
Pm
i=1 i ^ !i = 0 for some 1-forms 1; :::; m. Obviously, this result
is not sucient, we need i = di, compare equations (A.8) and (A.11) below.
4. Mathematical integration: necessary and sufficient conditions
The conditions given so far are not sucient for mathematical integration. Our
objective now is to give sucient conditions and to express them as a system of
partial dierential equations that have to be satised by the coecient functions
ik and the function x(A).
Notice that ii = 1 for every i = 1; :::;m and ikki = 1. Equation (2.2) implies
that
1
k
@V
@aij
= ik
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
(4.1)
Dene a family of 1-forms 
k, k = 1; :::;m, by

k =
mX
s=1
sk!
s (4.2)
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where !s is the 1-form dened by (2.3) or the equivalent form (2.7). Notice that

1; :::;
m are dened using observable functions only. Then equation (4.1) can be
written as kdV = 
k which is equivalent to 
k ^ d
k = 0. Clearly, the family
of 1 forms dened by (4.2) are collinear to the same gradient dV . The last equa-
tion gives us the necessary and sucient conditions for mathematical integration.
This result stems from the underlying structure of the optimization problem. The
following result proves that the 1-forms 
1; :::;
m are proportional.
Lemma 4.1. Let 
1; :::;
m be the family of 1-forms dened by (4.2) with ik =
i
k
then 
i ^ 
k = 0 for all i; k = 1; :::;m.
Proof. Using the denition of 
k in (4.2) we have

i ^ 
k =
mX
s;t=1
(tisk)!
t ^ !s =
X
t<s
(tisk   sitk)!t ^ !s
The coecients tisk   sitk are identically zero since
tisk
sitk
=
ts
ik
ik
st
= 1
This proves the result. 
This is a general result that is true for any 1-forms dened by equation (4.2)
with coecients ik = i=k. This result is obvious if 
k = kdV .
Theorem 4.1. Given the family of 1-forms 
1; :::;
m dened above, then there
exist m+1 functions 1; :::; m and V , dened in a neighbourhood U of some point
A 2 Rmn++, such that kdV = 
k for k = 1; :::;m if and only if the condition

k ^ d
k = 0 holds in a neighbourhood V of A with U  V.
Proof. Using Darboux Theorem [4], 
k ^ d
k = 0 if and only if there exist two
functions k and Vk such that kdVk = 
k. Lemma 4.1 implies that

i ^ 
k = ikdVi ^ dVk = 0
Therefore, dVk = ik(A)dVi, 8i; k = 1; :::;m for some function ik. So we can set
dV1 =    = dVm = dV . 
We also need the following lemma
Lemma 4.2. Let 
1; :::;
m be the family of dierential 1-forms dened in (4.2).
Then, if 
i ^ d
i = 0 for some i, then 
k ^ d
k = 0 for any k 2 f1; :::;mg.
Proof. Let i; k 2 f1; :::;mg. Assume that 
i ^ d
i = 0. Note that 
i ^ 
k = 0 if
and only if 
k = '
i for some function '. Taking the exterior derivative we get
d
k = 'd
i + d' ^ 
i. Multiply both sides of the last equation by 
k and using
the fact that 
k = '
i, we nd that 
k ^ d
k = '2
i ^ d
i + '
i ^ d' ^
i = 0.
This completes the proof. 
Clearly, the 1 forms 
1; :::;
m belong to the space of 1 forms spanned by
!1; :::; !m. Moreover, it follows from the denition of !1; :::; !m that they are
linearly independent since !1 ^ ::: ^ !m 6= 0. Let us consider the following result
Lemma 4.3. Let 1; :::; m belong to the subspace of 1 forms spanned by 1; :::; m.
Suppose that 1; :::; m are linearly independent; that is, 1 ^ ::: ^ m 6= 0. Then
i ^ k = 0 if and only if there exist Cm2 rank-one symmetric m  m matrices
Mik = (bisbkt), such that i =
Pm
s=1 bis
s.
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Proof. Since 1; :::; m belong to the linear span of 
1; :::; m then for any i there
exist m functions bi1; :::; bim such that i =
Pn
j=1 bis
s Therefore, i ^ k =P
s;t bisbkt
s ^ t =Ps<t(bisbkt   bitbks)s ^ t. Thus, i ^ k = 0 if and only if
bisbkt = bitbks. 
Our objective now is to explicit the necessary and sucient conditions for math-
ematical integration given in theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2. Given the family of 1-forms 
1; :::;
m. Then 
k ^ d
k = 0 if
and only if for any k0 2 f1; :::;mg the following conditions are satised for all
1  i; s  m, 1  j; l  n.
@ik
@asl
X
r
@xr
@aij
air   ik
@xj
@asl
+
k0
kk0
0@X
j0
@sk
@ak
0
j0
ak
0
j0
X
r
@xr
@asl
asr   sk
X
j0
@xl
@ak
0
j0
ak
0
j0
  1
k0
@k0k
@asl
+ k0k
X
j
@xj
0
@asl
ak
0
j0
1Aik nX
r=1
@xr
@aij
air
=
@sk
@aij
X
r
@xr
@asl
asr   sk
@xl
@aij
+
k0
kk0
0@X
j0
@ik
@ak
0
j0
ak
0
j0
X
r
@xr
@aij
air   ik
X
j0
@xj
@ak
0
j0
ak
0
j0
  1
k0
@k0k
@aij
+ k0k
X
j0
@xj
0
@aij
ak
0
j0
1Ask nX
r=1
@xr
@asl
asr (4.3)
Proof. See Appendix. 
Remark 4.1. It is clear that the necessary and sucient conditions are imposed
on observable functions. Moreover, when we get the functions 1; :::; k and V by
setting i = kik so as to get (2.2) as required.
The next result proves that (4.3) includes the conditions given in theorem (3.1).
Corollary 4.1. Suppose that conditions (4.3) are satised then
(a) Si = S
T
i , for all i = 1; :::;m.
(b) Si = ikS
T
k for all i; k = 1; :::;m.
Proof. If s = k0 = i = k then, using the fact that ii = 1, relations (4.3) boil down
to the following symmetry conditions
@xj
@ail
  i
0@X
j0
@xl
@aij0
aij0  
X
j0
@xj
0
@ail
aij0
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@aij
air
=
@xl
@aij
  i
0@X
j0
@xj
@aij0
aij0  
X
j0
@xj
0
@aij
aij0
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@ail
air
so we get (a). To prove (b), it suces to take k0 = s = k and i 6= k in (4.3) which
writes down in this case as
@ik
@akl
X
r
@xr
@aij
air   ik
@xj
@akl
+ kik
0@ X
j0
@xl
@akj0
akj0 +
X
j
@xj
0
@akl
akj0
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@aij
air
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=  @x
l
@aij
+ k
0@X
j0
@ik
@akj0
akj0
X
r
@xr
@aij
air   ik
X
j0
@xj
@akj0
akj0
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@akl
akr (4.4)
Now, multiply both sides by aij , summing over j and solving to get the following
formula
@ik
@akl
= ikk
0@X
j0
@xl
@akj0
akj0  
X
j
@xj
0
@akl
akj0
1A iX
j0
@xl
@aij0
aij0+k
X
j0
@ik
@akj0
akj0
nX
r=1
@xr
@akl
akr
substitute back into (4.4) to get the conditions Si = ikS
T
k . 
Now, we have the following theorem that solves the mathematical integration
problem.
Theorem 4.3. Given a function x(A) 2 Rn++ and a family of strictly positive
functions ik, 1  i; k  m all of class C2 dened in a neighbourhood V of some
point A such that tisk = sitk for all 1  i; k; s; t  m. Dene the functions
C1(a1); :::; Cm(am) by Ci(ai) = (ai)Tx(A). Then, there exist m + 1 functions
1; :::; k and V , dened in a possibly smaller neighbourhood U  V, such that
kdV = 
k if and only if conditions (4.3) are satised in V.
Proof. Given the functions x(A) and ik, 1  i; k  m as in the statement of
the theorem, dene a family of 1-forms 
k, k = 1; :::;m as in (4.2). Symmetry
conditions (4.3) are equivalent to 
k ^ d
k = 0 for all k. Now, 
k ^ d
k = 0 if
and only if there exist two functions k and Vk such that kdVk = 
k. Symmetry
conditions on the coecients ik guarantee that dV1 =    = dVk = dV using
lemma (4.3). The proof is complete.

5. Economic integration
In this section, we give the necessary and sucient conditions for the existence
of m+1 functions 1; :::; m and V such that dV = (dC   x) where 1; :::; m are
strictly positive and V is quasi-convex with respect to each ai, i = 1; :::;m. Such a
result solves the economic integration problem. The following theorem relates the
matrix iSk, for any i; k, to the value function V and the mapping C.
Theorem 5.1. Let x(A) be a solution of a problem of type (P), 1; :::; m be the
associated Lagrange multipliers and V (A) be the value function then
i
0@@xj
@akl
  k
nX
j0=1
@xj
@akj0
akj0
nX
r=1
@xr
@akl
akr
1A =   @2V
@akl @a
i
j
+ i
@2Ci
@akl @a
i
j
ik+
i
i
0@X
j0
@2V
@akl @a
i
j0
aij0  
0@iX
j0
@2Ci
@akl @a
i
j0
aij0  
@V
@akl
1A ik
1A @V
@aij
+
k
k
0@X
l0
@2V
@akl0@a
i
j
akl0  
i
i
X
j0;l0
@2V
@akl0@a
i
j0
akl0a
i
j0
@V
@aij
+ i
X
j0;l0
@2Ci
@akl0@a
i
j0
akl0a
i
j0
@V
@aij
ik
  @V
@aij
ik   i
X
l0
@2Ci
@akl0@a
i
j
akl0
i
k
!
@V
@akl
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The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix.
Notice that if i 6= k then the Hessian matrix of the mapping C(A) drops out of
this formula because of the assumption that Ci depends on ai only.
Remark 5.1. Set i = k in the previous equality. Then
iSi =  D2aiV + iD2aiCi +Ri
Where Ri is a rank one symmetric matrix that takes the form Q(DaiV )
T for some
matrix Q. Let  2 fDaiV g? then we have
TSi =   1
i
T (D2aiV ) + 
T (D2aiC
i)
It follows that the n  n matrix Si has no specic negativity properties since the
rst term is negative while the second one is positive. In fact, this holds true for
any vector  2 Rn since any such vector can be written as  =  + tai where 
is orthogonal to DaiV . This follows from the fact that (a
i)TDaiV =
i
i
6= 0 and
theorem 5.1.
If the function Ci(ai) is an ane function then the matrix Si is indeed negative
semi-denite. Moreover, if we pre-multiply both sides of the equality in theorem
5.1 by (ai)T and post-multiply both sides by ai then both sides of the equality are
identically zero. To see this, it suces to use the fact that i = i(a
i)TDaiV .
Although the matrix Si is not necessarily negative semi-denite, there do exist
negativity conditions related to the function x(A). We have the following result
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that V (A) is the value function, x(A) is a solution and (A)
is the associated vector of Lagrange multipliers for problem (P), C(A) = Ax(A).
Then we have
D2aiV (A) = i(A)(D
2
aiC
i(ai) Daix(A)) +Dai(A)(DaiCi(ai)  x)T (5.1)
Moreover, the n n matrix D2aiCi(ai) Daix(A) is symmetric and positive semi-
denite on (DaiV )
?.
Proof. Equation (5.1) follows by dierentiating the rst order conditions DaiV =
i(DaiC
i(ai)   x) and the positivity result follows from the fact that the value
function V is quasi-convex with respect to ai. 
We have also the following results
Lemma 5.2. Let x(A) be a solution of problem (P) and C(A) = Ax(A). ThenX
r
@2xr
@akl @a
i
j
asr +
@xl
@aij
sk +
@xj
@akl
is =
@2Cs
@akl @a
i
j
is
k
s (5.2)
Moreover, if Ci(ai) is a convex function then the n n matrix M i where
M ijl =
X
r
@2xr
@ail@a
i
j
air +
@xl
@aij
+
@xj
@ail
is symmetric and positive semi-denite.
Proof. Dierentiating the sth constraint with respect to aij and a
k
l
nX
r=1
@2xr
@akl @a
i
j
asr +
@xl
@aij
sk +
@xj
@akl
is =
@2Cs
@akl @a
i
j
is
k
s (5.3)
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Thus, we have equation (5.2). Positivity follows from the convexity of Ci(ai).

Lemma 5.3. Let x(A) and C(A) be as above. Then the matrix T i dened by
T ijl =
X
r
@2xr
@ail@a
i
j
air +
@xl
@aij
is symmetric and positive semi-denite on the subspace f(ai)TDaixg?.
Proof. It follows from the above calculations that T i + Daix = D
2
aiC
i. Using
equation (5.1) and the fact that DaiC
i   x = 1iDaiV , we get
D2aiV = iT
i +
1
i
(Daii)(DaiV )
T
The result follows from the last equality, the quasi-convexity of V with respect to
ai and the fact that DaiV = i((a
i)TDaix). 
The following theorem solves the economic integration problem
Theorem 5.2. Let x(A) 2 Rn++, ik(A) > 0 be given functions dened on a
neighbourhood U of some point A 2 Rmn++. Dene C(A) = Ax(A). Suppose that the
following conditions are satised in U for all i; k = 1; :::;m
(a) tisk = sitk for all 1  i; k; s; t  m.
(b) Conditions (4.3).
(c) The matrix M i is positive semi-denite.
(d) The restriction of the matrix T i to f(ai)TDaixg? is positive denite.
Then, there exist positive functions 1; :::; m and a function V which is quasi-
convex with respect to ai for each i, dened in a neighbourhood V  U such that
DaiV = i(DaiC
i   x).
Proof. Notice rst that condition (c) implies that the function Ci(ai) is convex.
Consider the family of 1-forms 
1; :::;
m dened by

k =
X
i;j
ik
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
daij =
mX
i=1
ik
nX
r;j=1
@xr
@aij
airda
i
j
Conditions (4.3) are equivalent to 
k ^ d
k = 0. Using Darboux theorem, the last
equation is satised if and only if there exist two functions k and V such that
kdV = 
k. Note that V is independent of k. Therefore, we have
kdV =
mX
i=1
ik
nX
r;j=1
@xr
@aij
airda
i
j (5.4)
Apply the previous 1-form to the vector eld s to get
k((a
s)TDasV ) = sk
1
s
It follows that s(A)k(A)(a
s)TDasV (A) = sk(A) > 0, for all A in suciently
small neighbourhood of some point A . We can assume that s(a
s)TDasV > 0 and
k > 0. Substitute for ik in (5.4), we get
kdV =
X
i
ki((a
i)TDaiV )
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
daij
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Canceling k and setting i = i((a
i)TDaiV ) > 0, we obtain
dV =
mX
i=1
i
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
daij
It remains to prove that the function V has the required positivity conditions. Note
that
@2V
@asl @a
i
j
=
mX
i=1
i
 
nX
r=1
@2xr
@asl @a
i
j
air +
@xl
@aij
is
!
+
@i
@asl
nX
r=1
@xr
@aij
air
Using relations (5.3), we can write D2pV as
@2V
@asl @a
s
j
= sT
s
jl +
@s
@asl
nX
r=1
@xr
@asj
asr
Take a vector % 2 fDasV g?; that is, % satises the condition
nX
j=1
nX
r=1
@xr
@asj
asr%j = 0
It follows that
nX
j;l=1
@2V
@asl @a
s
j
%j%l = s
nX
j;l=1
T sjl%j%l > 0
We conclude that the matrix D2asV is positive denite on fDasV g?; that is, V is
quasi-convex with respect to as. The proof is complete. 
6. Duality
After solving the mathematical and economic integration problems, we get func-
tions 1; :::; m and V that have the required properties. The question now is
how to get a concave (or quasi-concave) objective function. In the single con-
straint case, if V (a) is strongly convex (meaning that the Hessian is positive), then
f (x) = mina fV (a) j a0x  c (a)g is quasi-convex (see [5], Proposition 11).
The objective function can be obtained from the value function using the duality
relation
f(x) = minfV (A)j(ai)Tx(A) = Ci(A)g
The function f is not necessarily quasi-concave. However, we can introduce a class
of functions that is stable under duality, see [3] and [10]. We need to dene the
following space
E(A) = f = (1; :::; m) 2 Rmnj(i)TDaiV = 0; i = 1; :::;mg
We now recall the denitions of QE-convex and QE-concave introduced by Epstein
[10].
Denition 6.1. Let U  Rn++ and V  Rmn++. Suppose that C(A) is a convex
mapping.Then,
 We say that a function f(x) is locally QE-concave if
8x 2 U ; 9A 2 V such that f(x) = max
x2U
ff(x)jAx = C(A)g
 We say that a function V (A) is locally QE-convex if
8A 2 V; 9x 2 U such that V (A) = min
A2V
fV (A)jAx = C(A)g
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We have the following theorems:
Theorem 6.1. The value function V (A) is locally QE-convex if D2PV is positive
denite on E(A).
Proof. Let V be a neighbourhood of a point A in which the function V is dened.
The assumption that D2PV is positive denite on E(A) for all A 2 V implies that if
 = (1; :::; m) 2 E such that (a1 + 1; :::; am + m) 2 V then
V (a1 + 1; :::; am + m) > V (a1; :::; am) (6.1)
To show that V is locally QE-convex, suppose that A is given. Let x be such
that
V (A) = min
A
fV (A)jAx = C(A)g
Take
x(A) = DaiCi(ai)  1i(A)DaiV (A
)
and
i(A
) = i(A)(ai)TDaiV (A)
where  1i = (a
i)T (DaiC
i) Ci(ai). The point A satises the rst order optimality
conditions. Its clear that Ax(A) = C(ai). The point A satises the second
order condition for minimum which is the positive deniteness of D2AV on E(A).
This completes the proof. 
Now, we need to show that the function
f(x) = min
A2V
fV (A)jAx = C(A)g
is locally QE-concave if V is locally QE-convex. Let f(x) be a given locally QE-
concave function. Dene a function V : V  Rmn++ ! R by
V (A) = max
x2U
ff(x)jAx = C(A)g
dene also the function f(x) = min
A2V
fV (A)jAx = C(A)g.
Suppose that the function V (A) is dened in a neighbourhood of some point
A 2 Rmn++, then U = fx 2 Rn++jAx = C(A); 8A 2 Vg. The following theorem
establishes duality between f and V .
Theorem 6.2. If V is locally QE-convex then f is locally QE-concave. Moreover,
f = f throughout U if f is locally QE-concave.
Proof. See [1]. 
Theorem (5.1) implies that, on the space E , we have for any xed k0 2 f1; :::;mg
k0
@2V
@akl @a
i
j
= ik0
 X
r
@2xr
@akl @a
i
j
air(1  ik) + T ijlik
!
:= Kikjl
Clearly, the assumption of positive deniteness of D2V on the subspace E can
now be stated in terms of observable functions, namely ik0 and x. Moreover,
it is a stronger condition than the assumption of positive deniteness of T i on
f(ai)Daixg? as required in theorem (5.2). To put all pieces of the puzzle together,
we state the following theorem that gives the solution of the inverse problem:
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Theorem 6.3. Let x(A) 2 Rn++, ik(A) > 0 be given functions dened on a
neighbourhood U of some point A 2 Rmn++. Dene C(A) = Ax(A). Suppose that the
following conditions are satised throughout U
(a) tisk = sitk for all 1  i; k; s; t  m.
(b) Conditions (4.3).
(c) The matrix M i is positive semi-denite.
(d) The restriction of the tensor K to the subspace E is positive denite.
Then, there exists a locally QE-concave function f(x) such that
x(A) 2 argmaxff(x)jAx = C(A)g
7. Particular case: m = 2
In the 2-constraint particular case, we have i; s; k; k0 2 f1; 2g which gives 16 cases
to consider in theorem 4.2. Fortunately, some of these cases are redundant. The
rst type of redundancy comes from the proportionality of 
1 and 
2 and Lemma
4.2. Consequently, we can take only one value for k, say k = 1, and k0 2 f1; 2g.
The second kind of redundancy arises from symmetry with respect to i and s,
the case s = 1; i = 2 gives the same conditions as s = 2; i = 1. This reduces the
number of cases to be considered to 6. Let  = 21, note that 11 = 22 = 1 and
12 = 1=21 . We consider each case in turn
(a) First we set k = k0 = 1. We consider the following 3 subcases:
(i) s = i = 1, in this case 11 = 1. After canceling identical terms from both
sides we get
@xj
@a1l
+ 1
X
j0
@xl
@a1j0
a1j0
nX
r=1
@xr
@a1j
a1r =
@xl
@a1j
+ 1
X
j0
@xj
@a1j0
a1j0
nX
r=1
@xr
@a1l
a1r (7.1)
So we have S1 = S
T
1 .
(ii) s = 1; i = 2 we get in this case the following conditions
@
@a1l
X
r
@xr
@a2j
a2r   
@xj
@a1l
+ 1
0@ X
j0
@xl
@a1j0
a1j0 +
X
j
@xj
0
@a1l
a1j0
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@a2j
a2r
=   @x
l
@a2j
+ 1
0@X
j0
@
@a1j0
a1j0
X
r
@xr
@a2j
a2r   
X
j0
@xj
@a1j0
a1j0
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@a1l
a1r (7.2)
Multiply both sides of the previous equation by a2j and summing over j
we nd the following formula
@
@a1l
= 1
X
j0
 
@xl
@a1j0
  @x
j0
@a1l
!
a1j0   2
X
j0
@xl
@a2j0
a2j0 + 1
X
j0
@
@a1j0
a1j0
X
r
@xr
@a1l
a1r
Substitute in the previous equation for @
@a1l
we get the condition S2 = S1.
(iii) s = i = 2
@
@a2l
X
r
@xr
@a2j
a2r   
@xj
@a2l
  12
X
j0
@xl
@a1j0
a1j0
nX
r=1
@xr
@a2j
a2r
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=
@
@a2j
X
r
@xr
@a2l
a2r   
@xl
@a2j
  12
X
j0
@xj
@a1j0
a1j0
nX
r=1
@xr
@a2l
a2r (7.3)
(b) k = 1; k0 = 2. We have another 3 subcases to consider:
(i) i = s = 1
@xj
@a1l
+ 2
0@X
j0
@xl
@a2j0
a2j0 +
1
2
@
@a1l
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@a1j
a1r
=
@xl
@a1j
+ 2
0@X
j0
@xj
@a2j0
a2j0 +
1
2
@
@a1j
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@a1l
a1r (7.4)
(ii) i = s = 2
@
@a2l
X
r
@xr
@a2j
a2r   
@xj
@a2l
  22
0@X
j0
@xl
@a2j0
a2j0 +
1
2
@
@a2l
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@a2j
a2r
=
@
@a2j
X
r
@xr
@a2l
a2r   
@xl
@a2j
  22
0@X
j0
@xj
@a2j0
a2j0 +
1
2
@
@a2j
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@a2l
a2r (7.5)
Multiply both sides of the last equation by p2j and summing over j, we
get
@
@a2l
= 2
X
r

@xr
@a2l
  @x
l
@a2r

a2r
Substituting back in the above equation we get S2 = S
T
2 .
(iii) s = 1; i = 2
@
@a1l
X
r
@xr
@a2j
a2r   
@xj
@a1l
  2
0@2X
j0
@xl
@a2j0
a2j0 +
@
@a1l
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@a2j
a2r =  
@xl
@a2j
+2
0@X
j0
@
@a2j0
a2j0
X
r
@xr
@a2j
a2r   
X
j0
@xj
@a2j0
a2j0  
1
2
@
@a2j
+ 
X
j0
@xj
0
@a2j
a2j0
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@a1l
a1r
(7.6)
So far, we have proved the following theorem
Theorem 7.1. Given functions x and  of class C2. There exist three functions
V; 1 and 2 such that DaiV = i(DaiC
i   x), i = 1; 2 if and only if conditions
(7.1)-(7.6) are fullled.
8. Geometry of the problem
Consider the following pair of dual problems
v(a) = maxu(x) subject to aTx = c(a)
and
f(x) = min v(a) subject to aTx = c(a)
The rst order conditions for those problems are, respectively
@v
@pi
= 

@c
@ai
  xi

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and
@f
@xi
= ai
Dene the 1-form
!(a) =
nX
i=1

@c
@ai
  xi

dai
Then !(a) vanishes on the tangent space to the (n 1)-dimensional manifold dened
by
M(a) = fa 2 Rnjv(a) = constantg
That is, for any  2 TaM , < !(a);  >= 0. This is our integration problem: given
!(a), can we nd a (n   1)-dimensional manifold M such that ! vanishes on the
tangent space of M . The existence of this manifold is guaranteed by the symmetry
of the matrix
S = Dax+
1
a0(Dax)a
((Dax)  (Dax)0)aa0(Dax)
Following the argument in [7], take a mapping x(a) that we assume to be invertible
with inverse a(x). Dene the 1-form (x) =
Pn
i=1 aidx
i. Integrating  means that
we want to nd a (n   1)-dimensional manifold such that the form  vanishes on
its tangent space.
In the general m-constraint case, we have the following dual problems
V (A) = maxU(x) subject to Ax = C(A)
and
f(x) = minV (A) subject to Ax = C(A)
The rst order conditions for these problems are, respectively
@V
@aij
=
X
k
k
@Ck
@aij
  ixj
and
@f
@xi
=
mX
k=1
ka
k
j
Analogously, we dene a family of 1-forms !1; :::; !m by !i = dCi  Pj xidaij .
The symmetry of the matrix Si guarantees the existence of a (n   1)-dimensional
manifold
Mi = fai 2 RnjVi(ai; a i) = cig
where a i denotes the set of row vectors of the matrix A except the ith row, such
that !i vanishes over its tangent space. Clearly, this is not sucient for our purpose.
This is reected in the fact that these symmetry conditions are not sucient for
mathematical integration.
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9. Applications
In this section, the dependent variables will be denoted by P instead of A as
they represent prices. The inverse problem we considered in this article has inter-
esting applications in microeconomics. The results we got here extend basic results
in microeconomic theory. This kind of problems, maximization under several con-
straints, arise in many economic contexts; e.g., rationing, choice under uncertainty
and other applications such as models of uncertainty with production. The objec-
tive function f is called the individual's utility function. This function represents
the tastes (or preferences) of the consumer on the set of aordable goods. The so-
lution of the optimization problem is called, in such models, the individual demand
function. The value function is called the indirect utility function which gives the
maximum utility achieved by the consumer under budget constraints. This func-
tion has many interesting properties in the basic individual model. These properties
include zero-homogeneity and quasi-convexity. In our setting, however, the indi-
rect utility function is quasi-convex with respect to each ai if each component of
the mapping C is convex. It is not zero-homogeneous unless income mapping is
one-homogeneous.
9.1. The basic consumer's problem. The basic individual problem in consumer
theory takes the form of a maximization problem of the utility function U(x) under
one budget constraint in which the income y is price independent; that is,
max
x
U(x) subject to pTx = y
where p 2 Rn++ is the price vector. The solution to this problem, x(p; y) that is
called the individual demand function is, characterized by the following conditions:
 pTx(p; y) = y (Walras law).
 x(tp; ty) = x(p; y) (zero-homogeneity).
 Symmetry and negative semi-deniteness of the Slutsky matrix S where
Sij =
@xi
@pj
+
@xi
@y
xj
9.2. The consumer's problem when income is price dependent. Now, if
the consumer's income depends on the price vector p, then we have a maximization
problem of the utility function U(x) under the linear constraint pTx = c(p). In this
case, the necessary and sucient conditions of theorem (4.2) boil down to
@xj
@pl
  
0@X
j0
@xj
@pj0
pj0  
X
j0
@xj
0
@pj
pj0
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@pl
pr
=
@xl
@pj
  
0@X
j0
@xl
@pj0
pj0  
X
j
@xj
0
@pl
pj0
1A nX
r=1
@xr
@pj
pr
This is indeed the extended Slutsky matrix given in [2] that characterizes individ-
ual demand functions in the single constrain case. Moreover, if the function c is
independent of a then we get the Slutsky matrix of the standard individual model.
It is important to point out that in the single constraint case the symmetry of this
matrix is both necessary and sucient for mathematical integration.
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Remark 9.1. Equation (2.8) is a generalized Roy's identity in consumer theory.
This relation can be used, as in the classical individual model, to nd the demand
function from the indirect utility function V as the income mapping C is given
xj =
@Ci
@pij
  ((pi)T (DpiCi)  Ci(pi))
@V=@pijP
j
@V
@pij
pij
It can be readily veried that this formula reduces to the classical Roy's identity if
Ci is independent of the price vector ai.
We also get generalization of the results in [3] when the mapping C is independent
of A, see corollary (4.1).
9.3. Point rationing. There are two types of rationing: simple rationing and
points rationing. Simple rationing consists of exogenous restrictions on certain
consumption goods whereas points rationing means that the consumer has a certain
number of rationing coupons. Points rationing could be considered as replacing
a systems with one currency by a system of multiple currencies. Under points
rationing, the consumer's problem takes the form
max
(x1;:::;xn)
U(x1; :::; xn)
subject to the constraints
Pn
j=1 p
i
jx
j = ci(pi), i = 1; :::;m. In this model, pij refers
to the price of good j in currency i. It is assumed here that the individual's income
is price dependent.
10. Concluding remarks
In this paper,we have solved the inverse problem maxx f(x) subject to the linear
constraints Ax = C(A). We assumed that m < n and that the rank of the matrix
A is m. If m > n, then !1 ^ :::^!m = 0; that is, !1; :::; !m are linearly dependent.
Consequently, the condition
P
i id!
i ^ !1 ^ ::: ^ !m = 0 is fullled.
In fact, we have treated the problem in its most general form. In some cases,
however, we need to deal with some problems in which there is few number of
parameters. More precisely, we are given a mapping q ! A(q) so that the problem
depends, ultimately, on the parameters q. This would, rather, simplify the necessary
and sucient conditions. To get an idea of this case, we give a simple example
from microeconomic theory. Let us consider a consumer whose utility function is
U(x1; :::; xn) and his income is normalized to 1. Suppose that the prices of the n
consumption goods p1; :::; pn are determined by the prices of capital and labor used
in the production process, namely, wage rate w and capital rental price v. The
consumer maximizes U(x1; :::; xn) under the budget constraint p1(v; w)x
1 +    +
pn(v; w)x
n = 1. Let V (v; w) be the value function of this problem. Then, the
envelope theorem implies that
  1

dV = x0(Dvp)dv + x0(Dwp)dw := !
The necessary and sucient condition for this decomposition is !^d! = 0 is always
fullled in the parameter (v; w) space; this is a 3-form in a 2-dimensional space.1
1I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the issues discussed in this section
and for other constructive comments that contributed to improving the presentation of this article.
Errors are mine.
THE INVERSE PROBLEM IN CONVEX OPTIMIZATION WITH LINEAR CONSTRAINTS 19
Appendix A. Proofs of main results
A.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1. We use the following preliminary results in the proof
of theorem
Lemma A.1. Let x(A) be a solution of a multi-constraint maximization problem
of the above type then
(a)
nP
l=1
@xl
@aij
akl = 0 if i 6= k.
(b)
nP
j=1

@Ci
@aij
  xj

aij = (a
i)T (Daix)a
i.
Proof. Dierentiate the kth constraint (ak)Tx = Ck(ak) with respect to aij we get
nX
j=1
@xl
@aij
akl + x
jik =
@Ck
@aij
ik
Condition (a) follows when i 6= k. If i = k then multiply both sides of the last
equality by aij , summing over j and rearranging to get (b). This completes the
proof. 
We need also the following lemma
Lemma A.2. Let i, i = 1; :::;m be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the
ith constraint. Then, the m  m matrix  = (ik), i; k = 1; :::;m is symmetric
where
ik = k
nX
l=1
@i
@akl
akl
Moreover, let qi = ia
i then
ik = (q
k)T (D2akaiV )q
i + (qk)T (D2akaiC
i)qiik   kiik (A.1)
Proof. Let i; k 2 f1; :::;mg with i 6= k. By dierentiating equality (2.2) with respect
to akl we get
@2V
@akl @a
i
j
=
@i
@akl
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
  i @x
j
@akl
Multiply both sides of the last equality by aija
k
l and summing up to get
nX
j;l=1
@2V
@akl @a
i
j
aija
k
l =
nX
l=1
@i
@akl
akl
nX
j=1
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
aij   i
nX
j;l=1
@xj
@akl
aija
k
l
Using Lemma (A.1), we end up with
nX
j;l=1
@2V
@akl @a
i
j
aija
k
l = 
 1
i
nX
l=1
@i
@akl
akl
Multiply both sides by k, we nd that
ik = ki
nX
j;l=1
@2V
@akl @a
i
j
aija
k
l
This proves the symmetry of the matrix . 
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Equation (A.1) can be considered as a generalization of the homogeneity condi-
tion for Lagrange multiplier when Ci is independent of ai, see [3]. Now, we start
the proof of theorem 3.1
Proof. Let x(A) be a solution of problem (P) and (A) = (1(A); :::; m(A)) be
the corresponding vector of Lagrange multipliers. These functions are related to
the value function through decomposition (2.4). Taking the exterior derivative of
both sides of equation (2.4, gives the 2-form
mX
k=1
 
kd!
k + dk ^ !k

= 0 (A.2)
Introduce a family of vector elds 1; :::; m dened by
i =
nX
j=1
aij
@
@aij
(A.3)
Equation (2.7) implies that
< !i; i >=
nX
r;j=1
@xr
@aij
aira
i
j = (a
i)T (Daix)a
i =  1i
Notice that < !i; k >= 0 if i 6= k. Applying equation (A.2) to the vector eld i
mX
k=1
k < d!
k; (i; :) > +
mX
k=1
< dk; 
i > !k   di < !i; i >= 0
Since < !i; i >=  1i , solving for di, we get
di = i
 
mX
k=1
k < d!
k; (i; :) > +
mX
k=1
< dk; 
i > !k
!
(A.4)
Substituting this value of di into
Pm
i=1
 
id!
i + di ^ !i

= 0, we get
mX
i=1
 
id!
i + i
mX
k=1
 
k < d!
k; (i; :) > + < dk; 
i > !k
 ^ !i! = 0 (A.5)
Expanding each summation on the right-hand side of this equality, we can write
< d!k; (i; :) > =  
X
j;s;l
@xj
@asl
dasl ^ dakj (
nX
j=1
aij
@
@aij
; :)
=  
X
j;l
@xj
@ail
ailda
k
j +
X
j;s;l
@xj
@asl
aijda
s
l 
i
k
It follows thatX
k
k < d!
k; (i; :) > =  
X
j;k;l
k
@xj
@ail
ailda
k
j +
X
j;k;s;l
k
@xj
@asl
aijda
s
l 
i
k
=  
X
j;k;l
k
@xj
@ail
ailda
k
j + i
X
j;k;l
@xj
@akl
aijda
k
l
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Using Lemma (A.1), we getX
k
k < d!
k; (i; :) >=  
X
j;k;l
k
@xl
@aij
aijda
k
l + i!
i (A.6)
Similarly,
< dk; 
i >=<
X
s;l
@k
@asl
dasl ;
nX
j=1
aij
@
@aij
>=
nX
l=1
@k
@ail
ail =
1
i
ki (A.7)
Therefore,
mX
k=1
< dk; 
i > !k =
mX
k=1
1
i
ki!
k
It follows, from the above calculations, that
di =  i
X
k;l
nX
j=1
k
@xl
@aij
aijda
k
l +
X
k
ki!
k + ii!
i (A.8)
Using Lemma (A.2), we conclude that
di ^ !i =  i
X
k;l
nX
j=1
k
@xl
@aij
aijda
k
l ^ !i
Then, equation (A.5) becomes
X
i;j;k;l
0@i @xj
@akl
+ i
nX
j0=1
k
@xl
@aij0
aij0
nX
r;j=1
@xr
@aij
air
1A dakl ^ daij = 0 (A.9)
The result follows. 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof. Firstly, we prove that (a) implies (b). Dene a family of 1-forms 1; :::; m
by
i = i
X
l;j0;k
k
@xl
@aij0
aij0da
k
l
Symmetry conditions in (a) read as
i
0@@xj
@akl
  k
nX
j0=1
@xj
@akj0
akj0
nX
r=1
@xr
@akl
akr
1A = k
0@@xl
@aij
  i
nX
j0=1
@xl
@aij0
aij0
nX
r=1
@xr
@aij
air
1A
Recall the denition of !i in (2.7) and equation (2.5), the last symmetry conditions
are equivalent to
nX
i=1
(id!
i + i ^ !i) = 0
Multiply by !1 ^ ::: ^ !m to get condition (b).
Conversely, condition (b) means that there exist m dierential 1-forms 1; :::; m
such that
mX
i=1
(id!
i + i ^ !i) = 0 (A.10)
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Then, write i as
i =
X
k;l
'ikl(A)da
k
l
for some smooth functions 'ikl(A). Now, apply the 2-form in equation (A.10) to
the vector eld k for some 1  k  m, the rst summation gives, using equation
(A.6),
mX
i=1
i < d!
i; (k; :) >=  
X
i;j;l
i
@xl
@akj
akj da
i
l + k!
k
While the second summation gives us
mX
i=1
< i ^ !i; (k; :) >= (
nX
l=1
'ikla
k
l )!
k    1k k
It follows from the two previous equations that,
 
X
j;k;l
k
@xl
@aij
aijda
k
l + i!
i + (
nX
l=1
'kila
i
l)!
i    1i i = 0
Solving for i
i =  i
X
j;k;l
k
@xl
@aij
aijda
k
l + i
nX
l=1
'kila
i
l!
i + ii!
i (A.11)
So, we conclude that
i =  i
X
j;k;l
k
@xl
@aij
aijda
k
l mod !
i
Now, plug this value of i into (A.10) and expand to getX
i;j;k;l
0@i @xj
@akl
+ ik
nX
j0=1
@xl
@aij0
aij0
nX
r=1
@xr
@aij
air
1A dakl ^ daij = 0
Symmetry conditions (a) follow from the last equality. This completes the proof.

A.3. Proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof. Recall that 
k ^ d
k = 0 if and only if there exists a 1-form k such that
d
k = k ^ 
k (A.12)
The 1-form k can be identied ( mod 
k). Notice that

k =
mX
i=1
ik
nX
r;j=1
@xr
@aij
airda
i
j
Let k
0
be a vector eld dened as in (A.3), then
< 
k; 
k0 >= k0k(a
k0)T (Dak0x)a
k0 = k0k
 1
k0
To nd a 1-form k that satises equation (A.12), we apply both sides of that
equation to the vector eld k
0
, so we have
< d
k; (
k0 ; :) >=< k; 
k0 > 
k   k < 
k; k0 >
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Using the fact that < 
k; 
k0 >= k0k
 1
k0 and solving for k, we get
k =
k0
k0k
h
< k; 
k0 > 
k  < d
k; (k0 ; :) >
i
Substitute for k in equation (A.12) that becomes
d
k =   k
0
k0k
< d
k; (
k0 ; :) > ^
k (A.13)
Now

k =
mX
i=1
ik
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
daij
Taking the exterior derivative and using the budget constraint we nd that
d
k =
X
i;j;s;l
 
@ik
@asl
X
r
@xr
@aij
air   ik
@xj
@asl
!
dasl ^ daij
Now, we apply the 2-form d
k to the vector eld 
k0 , we conclude that
< d
k; (
k0 ; :) >=
X
i;j;l
 
@ik
@ak
0
l
X
r
@xr
@aij
air   ik
@xj
@ak
0
l
!
ak
0
l da
i
j
 
X
j;s;l
 
@k0k
@asl
X
r
@xr
@ak
0
j
ak
0
r   k0k
@xj
@asl
!
ak
0
j da
s
l
Rewrite equation (A.13) as
d
k +
k0
k0k
< d
k; (
k0 ; :) > ^
k = 0
Depending on the above formulas of d
k and < d
k; (
k0 ; :) > the last equation
can be expanded asX
i;j;s;l
0@@ik
@asl
X
r
@xr
@aij
air   ik
@xj
@asl
+
k0
kk0
0@X
j0
@sk
@ak
0
j0
ak
0
j0
X
r
@xr
@asl
asr   sk
X
j0
@xl
@ak
0
j0
ak
0
j0
  1
k0
@k0k
@asl
+ k0k
X
j0
@xj
0
@asl
ak
0
j0
1Aik nX
r=1
@xr
@aij
air
1A dasl ^ daij = 0 (A.14)
Write the previous equation asX
i;s;j;l
( k0k)
sl
ijda
s
l ^ daij = 0;
Where
( k0k)
sl
ij =
@ik
@asl
X
r
@xr
@aij
air ik
@xj
@asl
+
k0
kk0
0@X
j0
@sk
@ak
0
j0
ak
0
j0
X
r
@xr
@asl
asr   sk
X
j0
@xl
@ak
0
j0
ak
0
j0
  1
k0
@k0k
@asl
+ k0k
X
j
@xj
0
@asl
ak
0
j0
1Aik nX
r=1
@xr
@aij
air
Then equation (A.14) is satised if and only if ( k0k)
sl
ij = ( k0k)
ij
sl for any given
k0; k 2 f1; :::;mg and all 1  i; s  m and 1  j; l  n. So, we get the required
symmetry conditions. This completes the proof. 
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A.4. Proof of Theorem 5.1. First, we have from the envelope theorem
@V
@aij
= i
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
= i
X
r
@xr
@aij
air (A.15)
Dierentiate this equation with respect to akl , we get
@2V
@akl @a
i
j
=
@i
@akl
 
@Ci
@aij
  xj
!
+ i
 
@2Ci
@akl @a
i
j
ik  
@xj
@akl
!
(A.16)
Multiply both sides by aij , summing over j, and solving to get the following formula
@i
@akl
= i
X
j0
@2V
@akl @a
i
j0
aij0   ii
X
j0
 
@2Ci
@akl @a
i
j0
ik  
@xj
0
@akl
!
aij0
Note that
i
X
j0
@xj
0
@akl
aij0 =
@V
@akl
ik
Using the last two equations together with (A.15) and (A.16) we nd that
i
@xj
@akl
=   @
2V
@akl @a
i
j
+ i
@2Ci
@akl @a
i
j
ik + (A.17)
i
i
0@X
j0
@2V
@akl @a
i
j0
aij0  
0@iX
j0
@2Ci
@akl @a
i
j0
aij0  
@V
@akl
1A ik
1A @V
@aij
Now, multiply both sides of (A.16) by akl and add up with respect to l to get the
following formula after rearrangement
i
X
l0
@xj
@akl0
akl0 =
X
l0
@2V
@akl0@a
i
j
akl0+
i
i
X
j0;l0
@2V
@akl0@a
i
j0
akl0a
i
j0
@V
@aij
 i
X
j0;l0
@2Ci
@akl0@a
i
j0
akl0a
i
j0
@V
@aij
ik
(A.18)
+
@V
@aij
ik + i
X
l0
@2Ci
@akl0@a
i
j
akl0
i
k
To get this formula we used also
nX
l0=1
@i
@akl0
akl0 = i
X
j0;l0
@2V
@akl0@a
i
j0
akl0a
i
j0   ii
X
j0;l0
@2Ci
@akl0@a
i
j0
akl0a
i
j0
i
k + i
i
k
Recall that
iSk = i
0@@xj
@akl
  k
nX
j0=1
@xj
@akj0
akj0
nX
r=1
@xr
@akl
akr
1A
It suces to substitute from (A.15), (A.17) and (A.18) into this equation to get
the required formula. The proof is complete.
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